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ONE'S OWN SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION FOR THE USE OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
WORKS IN GOLAN V. GONZALES
The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make-or
decline to make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily when
speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches.'
INTRODUCTION
John Blackburn wrote a composition based on Shostakovich's Fifth
Symphony for a high school band to perform at a community event.2
As a creator, he relied on unfettered access to artistic works in the
public domain and freely copied the expression of another to create
new works. 3 Mr. Blackburn, however, later learned that the underly-
ing work for his composition, which he used because of its public do-
main status, was removed from the public domain by an act of
Congress.4 Mr. Blackburn no longer had an absolute right to freely
perform his arrangement of Shostakovich.5
Congress restored the copyright to Shostakovich's Fifth Symphony
and thousands of other works through section 514 of the Uruguay
Rounds Agreement Act (URAA), which removed certain foreign ar-
tistic works from the public domain.6 Congress implemented section
514 to finally comply with Article Eighteen of the Berne Convention,
which required the United States to restore copyrights to works still
protected by copyright in foreign countries. 7 These foreign works
1. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). But see discussion infra notes 203-233 and
accompanying text.
2. Mr. Blackburn was a plaintiff in Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007). See
infra notes 77-120 and accompanying text.
3. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 16, Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007)
(No. 05-1259) [hereinafter Appellants' Brief] (stating that Mr. Blackburn "specifically chose the
underlying Shostakovich work because he thought it was not encumbered by copyright").
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4976 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109 (2008)) infra notes 53-76 and accompanying text.
7. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 18(1)-(2),
Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. Arti-
cle Eighteen provides:
(1) This Convention shall apply to all works which, at the moment of its coming into
force, have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through the
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were in the U.S. public domain because the foreign authors failed to
comply with U.S. copyright formalities, the foreign authors were ineli-
gible for protection under past U.S. copyright laws, or the works were
phonorecords not within the subject matter of past copyright laws.8
When section 514 took effect, restored copyright owners filed notices
of intent to enforce the restored copyrights for tens of thousands of
works, including J.R.R. Tolkien's Lord of the Rings trilogy, prints of
German artist M.C. Escher, thousands of foreign films, music and art-
work for classic Japanese Godzilla motion pictures, early musical re-
cordings by Pablo Casals and Edwin Fischer, and numerous musical
works by Russian composers such as Shostakovich, Prokofiev,
Kabalevsky, and Stravinsky.9 Mr. Blackburn and other individuals us-
ing these works could no longer freely utilize artistic works that had
once been in the public domain, even if they began using the works
before section 514 took effect.' 0
On September 4, 2007, however, in Golan v. Gonzales, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that section 514
implicated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights and that section 514
must be subject to First Amendment scrutiny." Focusing on the ex-
pressive value in a person's use of public domain works, this Note
argues that First Amendment review is essential to safeguard the
rights of those who rely on the speech-enabling public domain. The
Golan court correctly concluded that removal of works from the pub-
lic domain interfered with the plaintiffs' ability to communicate
through unrestricted use of works they had already acquired. The
public domain is essential to the self-expression of performers and
creators, and copyright's internal First Amendment safeguards are
simply inadequate to combat section 514's impediment to the free ex-
pression of creators who use works in the public domain.
Part II explores various theories and definitions of the public do-
main, explains the rationale and operation of section 514 of the
URAA, and provides a brief overview of Eldred v. Ashcroft, which
expiry of the term of protection. (2) If, however, through the expiry of the term of
protection which was previously granted, a work has fallen into the public domain, of
the country where protection is claimed, that work shall not be protected anew.
Id. (emphasis added); see also William Gable, Restoration of Copyrights: Dueling Trolls and
Other Oddities Under Section 104A of the Copyright Act, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 181, 185 n.21
(2005).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(C)(i)-(iii).
9. See Gable, supra note 7, at 182-84; see also infra note 76.
10. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
11. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179. 1194 (10th Cir. 2007); see infra notes 77-120 and accom-
panying text.
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bears heavily on the Tenth Circuit's analysis. 12 Part III summarizes
the Tenth Circuit's unanimous opinion in Golan v. Gonzales.1 3 Part
IV examines the interests of individuals who use public domain works
and argues that First Amendment review is necessary to protect a cre-
ator's expressive interest that results from acquisition and use of pub-
lic domain materials. 14 Part V addresses the impact of Golan's
traditional contours test on general challenges to copyright law and
argues that First Amendment scrutiny is essential for statutes that re-
move works from the public domain.15
II. BACKGROUND
In Golan v. Gonzales the Tenth Circuit recognized a substantial
First Amendment limitation on Congress's Copyright Clause power.16
The Golan decision, however, is significant to the subsistence of the
public domain and important to individuals who rely on public do-
main works.17 To understand Golan's particular value to the public
domain, an appreciation of the hazy boundaries and varied content of
the public domain is necessary. 18 Section A provides a brief overview
of definitions and rationales for the public domain.19 Section B next
summarizes the Supreme Court's discussion in Eldred v. Ashcroft re-
garding the First Amendment as a limitation to legislation that di-
rectly impacts the public domain.20 Finally, Section C explains how
and why section 514 removes certain works from the public domain.21
12. See infra notes 16-76 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 77-120 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 121-251 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 252-266 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com (Sept. 5, 2007,
5:13 PM) ("This decision is quite important because it builds out from Eldred-a case that most
people saw as a loss-the beginnings of a first amendment jurisprudence that would limit
copyright.").
17. See infra notes 240-251 and accompanying text.
18. See James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Win-
ter/Spring 2003, at 1, 29. 31 (noting that the term "public domain" is used inconsistently and
advocating for "a better analytic process of definition-not to determine whether one definition
is the essential, true public domain, but the reverse-to focus on whether each is well-suited for
the tasks for which it was created").
19. See infra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 53-76 and accompanying text.
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A. Defining the Public Domain
Though there was once a dearth of public domain scholarship,
scholars have recently shown a revived interest in the subject.22 No
single definition or theory represents a consensus in the burgeoning
field of scholarship, and often a specific threat to the public domain
directs a scholar's particular theory.23 The recent scholarship reflects
a diversity of approaches and viewpoints, or even "a deep intellectual
divide" among commentators. 24
While some scholars view the public domain as what is left over
"after all methods of [copyright] protection are taken into account," 25
other scholars contend that the public has an affirmative right to ac-
cess and use material in the public domain.26 Under the former view,
a copyright statute that removes works from the public domain, or
somehow alters the public domain, may raise no further question
about possible interference with public rights.27 By the latter view, a
statute that removes works from the public domain may violate a per-
22. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783,
786-87 (2006) (reviewing thirteen different definitions of the public domain and arguing that
Duke's Conference on the Public Domain and the constitutional challenge in Eldred v. Ashcroft
were the "main catalysts" for revived public domain interest); Boyle, supra note 18, at 1 (provid-
ing the Foreword for a volume with several articles dedicated to the Conference on the Public
Domain held at Duke University School of Law in November 2001); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and
Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 216 (2002) ("[O]nly in recent
decades has the public domain become the object of serious scholarly study."); Center for the
Study of the Public Domain, Conference on the Public Domain, http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/
index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (providing background papers, papers from the conference,
and webcast video of event sessions). See also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to
Have Something to Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 308 (2004).
Professor Zimmerman argues that "defenders of the public domain" realized they "needed to
effectively explicate and defend the importance of a rich information commons" to counteract
the growing ability and effort of intellectual property owners to increase the "scope of control
they enjoy over various subsets of speech goods." Id. at 304, 308.
23. See Boyle, supra note 18, at 29 ("The most useful way to understand [the terms 'public
domain' and 'commons'] and the ways they are used ... is in relationship to the implicit fear or
concern about intellectual property that each attempts to alleviate and the implicit ideal of the
information ecology that each attempts to instantiate.").
24. Zimmerman, supra note 22, at 306.
25. Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA
137, 138 (1993) (providing a general critique of a positive rights view of the public domain).
26. See, e.g., Ochoa, supra note 22, at 259; see also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965, 967 (1990) (describing the public domain as a source of raw materials for new
creations).
27. See Samuels, supra note 25, at 176 (acknowledging that retroactive copyright restoration
might raise questions of constitutionality, but also explaining that "someone who has obtained a
copyright might be said to have a 'property' right or a 'vested' right that should not be impaired
by later legislation, the 'rights' of the public in so-called public domain works are hardly 'vested'
or 'property' rights" (emphasis omitted)).
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son's right to use public domain materials, though there are many dif-
ferent conceptions of the nature of this public right.28
The public domain may bestow a traditional property right to the
public, so that "the government cannot alienate that 'property' by re-
moving it from the public domain. ' 29 Scholars have also put forth less
conventional views of the public domain that specifically relate to the
freedoms of artists and creators.30 For example, the public domain
can be viewed as "a cultural landscape," where creators have "'base-
line rights' to engage in 'unplanned, fortuitous access and opportunis-
tic borrowing.'"31 Somewhat related is the idea that the public
domain is "a status that arises from the exercise of the creative imagi-
nation, thus to confer entitlements, privileges and immunities in the
service of that exercise. '32
Just as there are diverse views about the nature of the public right
to the public domain, there are also various theories about what the
public domain contains.33 The public domain relevant to copyright
law is often defined by what it does not contain: copyrighted or copy-
rightable material.34 By this construction of copyright/no copyright,
the public domain contains expressive works that are not covered by
copyright for various reasons, and also includes material that could
28. See Ochoa, supra note 22, at 259; Meredith Shaw, Note, "Nationally Ineligible" Works:
Ineligible for Copyright and the Public Domain, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1033, 1040-41
(2006); Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007) (advocating a positive rights
perspective of the public domain: "[E]ach member of the public-anyone-has a non-exclusive
right, subject to constitutionally permissible legislation, to use material in the public domain.").
29. See Ochoa, supra note 22, at 259; Edward Lee, The Public's Domain: The Evolution of
Legal Restraints on the Government's Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intel-
lectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 118 (2003) ("[T]he public domain accords everyone equal
ownership rights over material in the public domain, meaning 'public rights' of unrestricted ac-
cess to and use of the material.").
30. Samuelson, supra note 22, at 804.
31. Id. at 805 (quoting Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the
Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt
Hugenholtz eds., 2006)).
32. David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring
2003, at 463, 474. Lange specifically identifies the First Amendment as a possible source of law
to make his theory of the public domain a reality. Id. at 474 n.32: see also Samuelson, supra note
22, at 803.
33. See generally Samuelson, supra note 22, at 786.
34. See id. at 791 (describing this conception of the public domain, which the author identifies
as the most common, as "IP-free information resources"); Litman, supra note 26, at 968 (defin-
ing the "public domain" as "a commons that includes those aspects of copyrighted works which
copyright does not protect"). The idea of a public domain that includes all material not subject
to copyright does not necessarily resolve the question about whether the public has an owner-
ship. right in the material. Litman, supra note 26, at 1023 (arguing that the public domain is a
source for authors).
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never be copyrighted, such as facts or ideas. 35 Generally, copyright-
able works that are not covered by copyright fall into three categories:
works in which the copyright term has expired, works which fail to
comply with formal requirements, and government works.36
Though there are competing definitions of the public domain's
function and contents, there is not necessarily a correct, universal defi-
nition that is relevant to every case. 37 This Note specifically focuses
on public domain works affected by section 514-copyrightable works
that lost copyright protection because of failure to comply with for-
malities, lack of national eligibility, or subject matter limitations-
while considering the First Amendment claims of creators and artists
who interact with these works in the public domain.38
B. Constitutional Protection for the Public Domain:
Eldred v. Ashcroft
Scholars have considered the constitutional dimensions of the pub-
lic domain and generally agree that the public domain is constitution-
ally required to some extent. 39 The U.S. Constitution provides
Congress with the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. '40
Thus, the Constitution requires that copyrighted works pass into the
public domain at some point, as a perpetual grant of copyright protec-
tion would violate the Limited Times provision.4' Separately, the Su-
preme Court has also recognized the First Amendment value in
maintaining access to the public domain of ideas or information,42 and
35. See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intel-
lectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1166.
36. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 28, at 1046-48.
37. See Samuelson, supra note 22, at 833.
38. See infra notes 53-76 and accompanying text. The operative definition of the public do-
main in this Note is what Professor Samuelson describes as "information artifacts unencumbered
by intellectual property rights." Samuelson, supra note 22, at 789. According to this definition,
the public domain includes works for which intellectual property rights have expired "or are...
inoperative ... and publicly disclosed works that do not qualify for [intellectual property rights]
for one or more reasons." Id. (alterations in original).
39. Samuelson, supra note 22, at 792.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
41. Samuelson, supra note 22, at 792.
42. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985) ("Yet copy-
right does not prevent subsequent users from copying from a prior author's work those constitu-
ent elements that are not original-for example, quotations borrowed under the rubric of fair
use from other copyrighted works, facts, or materials in the public domain-as long as such use
does not unfairly appropriate the author's original contributions." (emphasis added)).
[Vol. 58:219
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commentators have conceived of access to the public domain as a First
Amendment right.43
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court considered Copyright
Clause and First Amendment challenges to legislation affecting indi-
viduals who rely on public domain materials.44 The plaintiffs were in
the business of distributing products and services built on works in the
public domain.45 They challenged the Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA), which delayed the entry of copyrighted works into the public
domain by extending copyright term protections for new and existing
copyrighted works by an additional twenty years. 46 The Court held
that the CTEA did not violate the Copyright Clause in light of the
text, history, and precedent relating to extending copyright terms.47
The Court also considered the plaintiffs' argument that the CTEA
infringed their free speech rights.48 Reasoning that copyright's limited
monopoly is compatible with free speech principles, the Court noted
that "copyright's purpose is to promote the creation and publication of
free expression. ' 49 The Court also relied on copyright's built-in First
Amendment safeguards: the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair
use defense. 50 In what are now controversial words, Justice Ginsburg
explained:
43. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Zimmerman, supra note 22,
at 374 (rejecting reliance solely on the Copyright Clause for protection of the public domain and
instead finding a "second, rich source of potential protection for the public domain, derived from
the First Amendment").
44. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 186 (2003).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 193.
47. Id. at 199-208.
48. Id. at 218-21.
49. Id. at 219.
50. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219. The idea/expression dichotomy refers to copyright law's protec-
tion of an author's "original expression," but not the "ideas and information conveyed by a
work." Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991); see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(2000) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regard-
less of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
Expression, in the context of Golan v. Gonzales, refers to "'the particular pattern of words, lines
and colors, or musical notes' that composites a work." Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179. 1184
(10th Cir. 2007) (quoting ROBERT A. GORMAN. COPYRIGHT LAW 23 (2d ed. 2006)); see also 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03D (2005). The fair use
defense allows the public to utilize a copyrighted work "for purposes such as criticism, comment.,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research."
17 U.S.C. § 107. For the court in Eldred, "[t]he fair use defense affords considerable latitude for
scholarship and comment, and even for parody." Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220 (internal citations
omitted). But see Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 562-65 (2004) (criticizing Justice Gins-
2008]
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To the extent such assertions raise First Amendment concerns, cop-
yright's built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to ad-
dress them. We recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly
when it declared copyrights "categorically immune from challenges
under the First Amendment." But when, as in this case, Congress
has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, fur-
ther First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary. 51
Lower courts were left to interpret this language, and many scholars
argued that Justice Ginsburg's dicta leaves the door open for First
Amendment review of Congress's copyright legislation. 52
C. An Unexpected Return Trip: The URAA's Removal of Public
Domain Works
Considering the various conceptions of the public domain, it is no
surprise that section 514 is controversial.53 Functionally, commenta-
tors have described section 514 of the URAA as a "highly technical,
convoluted" 54 statute that contains "several errors and omissions that
promise to aggravate and boggle the minds of many copyright own-
ers" and "ensur[es] copyright attorneys' employment for decades to
come. '55 Despite problems with the operation of the statute, the ra-
tionale for the implementation of section 514 is clear: to finally align
U.S. copyright law with the Berne Convention.56 The Berne Conven-
tion is a multilateral agreement in which countries agree to provide
the same copyright protection to foreign authors as they provide to
their own authors.57 Although the United States became a member of
burg's statement as overbroad and arguing that "[m]aking other people's speeches can be an
honorable endeavor," and that the "First Amendment doctrine should recognize the value of
copying, which can be an important part of self-definition and of participation in culture").
51. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (internal citations omitted).
52. See, e.g., Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft,
76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1330 (2003); see also infra notes 80, 98-120 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1387 (1995) (us-
ing the URAA, "a major overhaul of federal law," to support his ominous thesis "positing the
end of traditional copyright jurisprudence").
54. Gable, supra note 7, at 187.
55. Adam P. Segal, Zombie Copyrights: Copyright Restoration Under the New § 104A of the
Copyright Act, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 71, 84 (1997).
56. See Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 18. The United States first became a member of
the World Trade Organization and engaged in efforts to protect intellectual property rights
around the world in reaction to fears of piracy of U.S. works abroad. See Gable, supra note 7, at
185-86. In 1994, the United States helped organize the URAA, out of which came the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs Agreement). Id. at 186. The
TRIPs Agreement made Article Eighteen of the Berne Convention enforceable through WTO
mechanisms. Id.; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
57. See Gable, supra note 7, at 186 n.25 (noting that several commentators believe that Con-
gress went beyond the mandate of the Berne Convention with the implementation of § 104A).
226 [Vol. 58:219
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the Berne Convention in 1989, formal requirements of U.S. copyright
law previously conflicted with the Berne Convention mandates. 58 For
example, until the United States complied with the Berne Convention,
copyrighted works lost protection if the copyright owner failed to affix
copyright notice or if the owner failed to file a renewal application. 59
The United States' formal requirements were anomalous among
Berne Convention signatories, and the amendments to the 1976 Act
removed these formal requirements for all works still under copyright
protection.60 Section 514 was a retroactive remedy for those works
that had already passed into the public domain for failure to comply
with formalities. 61
Section 514 of the URAA, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A, restores
copyright protection to works in the U.S. public domain if the work
meets several requirements. 62 The work must have one author or
rightholder who was a foreign national or domiciliary at the time of
creation, 63 the national or domiciliary must be from a nation that ad-
heres to the Berne Convention, 64 the work must first be published
outside the United States,65 and the work cannot be "in the public
domain in its source country through expiration of a term of protec-
tion."'66 The work must also be in the public domain in the United
States for one of the following reasons:
(i) noncompliance with formalities imposed at any time by United
States copyright law, including failure of renewal, lack of proper no-
tice, or failure to comply with any manufacturing requirements; (ii)
lack of subject matter protection in the case of sound recordings
fixed before February 15, 1972; or (iii) lack of national eligibility[.]67
A restored copyright, therefore, confers the same rights as the original
copyright for the remainder of the term that would have resulted if
58. Segal, supra note 55, at 77-78.
59. Id. at 81 (describing the intricacies of the 1909 Act, covering works published prior to
January 1, 1978, which required the copyright holder to file a renewal application with the copy-
right office to receive an additional twenty-eight years of protection). The Berne Convention
specifically required that "[t]he enjoyment and exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any
formality." Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(2).
60. See Ochoa, supra note 22, at 230 (noting that Congress finally passed the Berne Conven-
tion Implementation Act, which did not remove works from the public domain, but rather re-
moved the formal requirement of notice).
61. See Gable, supra note 7, at 182.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2007).
63. § 104A(h)(6)(D).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. § 104A(h)(6)(B).
67. § 104A(h)(6)(C). One commentator has argued that nationally ineligible works should
not be considered "in the public domain," and thus a person using one of these works has no
affirmative use right. See Shaw, supra note 28, at 1056-57.
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the work had not fallen into the public domain.68 Consider Shos-
takovich's Tenth Symphony, which was published in 1954.69 The work,
governed by the 1909 Copyright Act, is eligible for a twenty-eight-year
term and a forty-seven-year renewal term, which was extended by the
CTEA to a sixty-seven-year renewal term.70 Thus, because of its cop-
yright restoration, Shostakovich's Tenth Symphony will not fall into
the public domain until 2049. 71
Any individual who began to use a restored work after January 1,
1996, is infringing the copyright of the copyright owner. 72 If an indi-
vidual used a public domain work before the date of restoration and
continues to use the work, however, section 514 classifies this user as a
reliance party.73 A reliance party who uses reproductions or copies of
a work has a twelve-month period to sell off the remaining copies,
though the reliance party cannot manufacture any new copies during
the twelve-month period. 74 A reliance party like Mr. Blackburn, who
created a derivative work of a public domain work before January 1,
1996, may "continue to exploit that derivative work for the duration
of the restored copyright" if he pays "reasonable compensation" to
the owner of the restored copyright.75 After January 1, 1996, many
copyright owners fully engaged in the protection of their restored
works, alerting reliance and non-reliance users of their renewed copy-
rights. 76 In the wake of Eldred, questions remained about the limits of
68. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(B).
69. See Copyright Catalog of Documents, http://www.copyright.gov/records/cohd.html (follow
"Search the Catalog" hyperlink, select "registration number" in the drop down menu, search
"PA0000832413") (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (providing record of restoration copyright notice
with date of publication of 1954).
70. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003).
71. (1954+28+67). See Segal, supra note 55, at 82 (computing copyright expiration date of an
Italian film restored under the URAA).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(1).
73. § 104A(h)(4)(A). The statute defines a reliance party as one who
with respect to a particular work, engages in acts, before the source country of that
work becomes an eligible country, which would have violated section 106 if the re-
stored work had been subject to copyright protection, and who, after the source coun-
try becomes an eligible country, continues to engage in such acts.
Id.
74. See Gable, supra note 7, at 219.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(A)-(B); see also Gable, supra note 7, at 220-28 (reviewing the
difficult distinction between "substantially similar reproductions" and "derivative works"). Ga-
ble explains that litigants assert that their use of an existing work qualifies as a "derivative
work," so that the parties can benefit from the mandatory license available to reliance parties.
Gable, supra note 7, at 220-28.
76. See Gable, supra note 7, at 182-83 (providing a detailed list that represents only the "tip of
the iceberg" of the "commercially and artistically far-reaching" universe of restored works). Re-
stored copyright owners must notify reliance parties of the restored copyright by filing a Notice
of Intent to Enforce (NIE) with the Copyright Office or by serving the NIE directly on the party
[Vol. 58:219
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judicial deference to Congress's Copyright Clause power and whether
the courts would breathe life into the First Amendment in the context
of removing works from the public domain.
III. SUBJECT OPINION: GOLAN V. GONZALES
In Golan v. Gonzales, the Tenth Circuit determined the constitu-
tionality of section 514 of the URAA in light of the Supreme Court's
analysis in Eldred v. Ashcroft.77 Framing the controversy in the con-
text of Eldred, the plaintiffs argued that section 514 was beyond the
bounds of Congress's Copyright Clause power and that section 514
impinged upon the First Amendment freedom of individuals using
public domain works. 78 By the time the Tenth Circuit issued its opin-
ion, three other courts, all relying on Eldred, concluded that section
514 did not exceed the limitations of the Copyright Clause 79 and two
district courts found that the statute was immune from First Amend-
ment scrutiny.80
The plaintiffs in Golan were orchestra conductors, educators, per-
formers, film archivists, and motion picture distributors; each relied
on the use of public domain work for his or her livelihood. 81 The
using the restored copyright. Id. at 211. NIEs filed with the Copyright Office are published on
the Federal Register. These NIEs provide constructive notice to the reliance party of the re-
stored copyright, though restored copyright owners had to file these notices two years after the
date of restoration, January 1, 1996. After the two-year period, the restored copyright owner
had to serve the reliance party directly. For all non-reliance parties, a restored copyright holder
could immediately enforce his or her rights against the infringer upon the effective date of resto-
ration. See id. at 211-12. See, e.g., Copyright Restoration of Works in Accordance with the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 46,134, 46,158 (Aug. 30, 1996), available at http://
www.copyright.gov/fedreg/1996/61fr46133.html (providing listing of NIEs).
77. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007). Judge Henry wrote the opinion,
joined by Judge Briscoe and Judge Lucero. Id. at 1181. As in Eldred, the Golan plaintiffs chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the CTEA in the district and appellate courts. Id. at 1183; see
infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
78. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1183.
79. See Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854, 2005 WL 914754 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005), affd
in part and remanded in part, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007); Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Gon-
zales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107
(D.D.C. 2004), affd sub nom. Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
80. Golan, 2005 WL 914754, at *1; Luck's, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 119.
81. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1181-82. The appellants described the reliance in stronger terms,
claiming that "[p]laintiffs chose their vocations years ago and developed their respective busi-
nesses based in part upon the design of the United States copyright system that allowed them
freely to use works in the public domain." Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 12-13. Lawrence
Golan, for example, conducted two small symphony orchestras that performed public domain
works to avoid licensing fees. Id. at 17. The appellants asserted that:
Golan discovered that the cost for a single performance of Shostakovich's Symphony
No. 1 by the Lamont Orchestra went from a one-time cost of approximately $130 to
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plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of both section 514 of the
URAA and the CTEA in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado.82 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs'
CTEA claims 83 and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs' sec-
tion 514 claims involving the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment.84
A. Section 514 and Congress's Copyright Clause Power
After generally reviewing the basics of copyright law85 and quickly
concluding that Eldred compelled dismissal of the plaintiffs' CTEA
claim,86 the Tenth Circuit considered whether section 514 exceeds
Congress's authority under the Copyright Clause. 87 The court recog-
purchase sheet music for the entire symphony and unlimited performances [when the
work was in the public domain] to $495 to merely rent the same music for a single
performance [as a licensing cost for rental of music and performance].
Id. See also supra notes 2, 4, and 5 and accompanying text for the experience of plaintiff
Blackburn.
82. Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004), affd, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir.
2007).
83. Id. at 1218-21 (concluding that the plaintiffs' challenge to the "CTEA is foreclosed by the
Eldred decision and, as such, Plaintiffs have asserted a legal theory not cognizable as a matter of
law," but refusing to dismiss the copyright and First Amendment claims for section 514 because
the plaintiff had adequately distinguished the holding in Eldred).
84. Golan, 2005 WL 914754, at *1. The court found that Congress has demonstrated "little
compunction" about removing works from the public domain and that Congress had a rational
basis for the statute in trying to promote protection for American authors by giving foreign
authors protection in the United States. Id. at *13-14. For the First Amendment claim, the
District Court saw "no need to expand upon the settled rule that private censorship via copyright
enforcement does not implicate First Amendment concerns." Id. at *14-17. The Court cited
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001), even though the Supreme Court in Eldred v.
Ashcroft explicitly rejected the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that copyright was absolutely immune
from First Amendment review. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 573 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
85. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1183-84 (10th Cir. 2007). The Tenth Circuit explained
that the Copyright Clause "is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors
by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired." Id. at 1183 (quoting Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studio, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)). The Tenth Circuit concluded that
"imaginative [public domain] works inspire new creations, which in turn inspire others, hope-
fully, ad infinitum." Id.
86. Id. at 1185. The plaintiffs argued that the challenge in Eldred only concerned Congress's
extension of copyright term for works with existing copyrights, whereas the plaintiffs were now
directly challenging the extension to a life-plus-seventy-years timespan for future copyrights. Id.
Citing the Ninth Circuit's dismissal of a similar challenge in Kahle v. Gonzales, the Tenth Circuit
agreed that "weighing the impetus provided to authors by longer terms against the benefit pro-
vided to the public by shorter terms ... is left to Congress, subject to rationality review." Id.
(quoting Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 958 (2008)).
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that Eldred's rationale applied to a challenge to the twenty-year
term extension for future copyrights and that there was "no compelling reason ... [to] depart
from a recent Supreme Court decision." Id. (quoting Kahle, 487 F.3d at 701).
87. Id. at 1186.
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nized the plaintiffs' argument that removing works from the public
domain "eviscerates" the limitations on Congress to give copyright
protection only for limited times and only to promote the Arts and
Sciences. 88 In the shadow of Eldred's teachings, however, the Tenth
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on patent law principles and
refused to second-guess Congress's copyright policy.8 9
The Tenth Circuit flatly rejected the plaintiffs' dependence on Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co. and disputed the relevance of patent law prin-
ciples to copyright law. 90 The Supreme Court in Graham stated that
"Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are
to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict
free access to materials already available." 9' The plaintiffs cited this
language to establish a baseline principle that Congress could never
remove material from the public domain, but the Tenth Circuit found
the rationale for this patent law rule lacking in the context of copy-
right law.92 While patents "prevent full use by others of the inventor's
knowledge," a copyright does not give the holder a monopoly over
knowledge. 93 The court concluded that while Graham's absolutist lan-
guage was appropriate for the public domain of patents, the holding
did not control in the context of copyright. 94
The court then turned to Eldred for guidance in briefly assessing
Congress's general power to legislate under the Copyright Clause. 95
The Tenth Circuit found that the "clear import of Eldred" was that
Congress has broad powers to legislate under the Copyright Clause, 96
and the court refused to question Congress's policy judgments. 97
B. Section 514 Requires First Amendment Scrutiny
The court did not end with its analysis of Congress's Copyright
Clause authority; rather, the court reasoned that a valid exercise of
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1187.
90. Id. at 1186-87.
91. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). In Graham, the Court concluded that
Congress could not authorize patents to an individual seeking to patent an invention already in
the public domain. Id.
92. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1186.
93. Id. (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003)).
94. Id. at 1187.
95. Id.
96. Id. As noted supra in notes 56 to 61 and accompanying text, Congress implemented the
URAA to comply with the Berne Convention, which secures copyright protection for American
works abroad. Thus, the URAA was not "so irrational or so unrelated" to promotion of the arts
and sciences as to render the statute unconstitutional. Id.
97. Id.
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power under the Copyright Clause could be subject to First Amend-
ment review. 98 On this point, the Tenth Circuit addressed Eldred di-
rectly and distinguished the case in two ways. 99 First, the court
reasoned that section 514 alters the traditional bounds of copyright
protection by deviating from the "bedrock" principle that public do-
main material cannot be copyrighted.100 Second, the court explained
how the URAA implicated plaintiffs' First Amendment interests and
found that the idea/expression dichotomy, the fair use defense, and
the statutory provisions for reliance parties did not adequately protect
the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests.10 1
Relying on Eldred, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that copyrights are
not "categorically immune from challenges under the First Amend-
ment," and legislation that altered the traditional contours of copy-
right protection could be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 10 2
Finding no federal authority that provided any definition for the tradi-
tional contours of copyright protection, the court explained that "the
term seems to refer to something broader than copyright's built-in
free speech accommodations." 10 3 Explaining that the traditional con-
tours of copyright have a functional and historical component, the
Tenth Circuit first addressed the functional aspect of the public do-
main. 10 4 According to the court, section 514 violated the principles
that a work normally progresses from creation to copyright to the
public domain, and that no individual may copyright a work in the
public domain. 10 5 Additionally, the court conducted a lengthy histori-
cal analysis of Congress's previous removal of works from the public
domain. 106 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the history and function
98. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1187 ("Congress has plenary authority in all areas in which it has sub-
stantive legislative jurisdiction so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some
other constitutional restriction." (internal citation omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 132 (1976))).
99. Id. at 1187-88.
100. Id. at 1188-92.
101. Id. at 1192-96.
102. Id. at 1188 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003)).
103. Id. at 1189.
104. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1189. To support a functional analysis, the court reasoned "that a
contour is 'an outline' or 'the general form or structure of something,"' and thus the court would
"assess whether removing a work from the public domain alters the ordinary procedure of copy-
right protection." Id. (quoting WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 284 (1984) for
the definition of "contour"). To support a historical analysis, the court found that using "the
word 'traditional' to modify 'contours' suggests that Congress's historical practice with respect to
copyright and the public domain must inform [their] inquiry." Id.
105. Id. at 1189-90.
106. Id. at 1190-92.
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of the public domain reflected a "bedrock principle ... that works in
the public domain remain in the public domain.' 10 7
The court then set out to describe how this alteration of basic copy-
right principles implicated the plaintiffs' First Amendment inter-
ests.108 The court started from the simple premise that every person
"has a non-exclusive right, subject to constitutionally permissible leg-
islation, to use material in the public domain." 10 9 The First Amend-
ment guarded this unrestrained right to artistic use, so that the
"speech at issue ... belonged to plaintiffs when it entered the public
domain."110 In the court's view, the plaintiffs relied on public domain
works and already created their own artistic works.' The court held
that section 514 interfered with the plaintiffs' vested rights of free ex-
pression and must be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 112
The court also found that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair
use provisions were not designed to protect the plaintiffs' First
Amendment interests in this case. 1 3 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
the idea/expression dichotomy was a valuable tool for the typical case
when an individual tries to gain monopoly privileges over an idea.'1 4
Yet, in this case, the idea/expression dichotomy was ill-suited to deter-
mine whether granting monopoly privileges over expression in the
public domain violated the First Amendment.1t 5 Likewise, though the
fair use doctrine provides latitude for scholarship and comment, the
court found that the doctrine was not a sufficient safeguard for the
First Amendment interests of the plaintiffs, who once had unrestricted
access to public domain works. 116
Finally, the court drew a distinction between section 514 and the
legislation at issue in Eldred, which provided supplemental First
107. Id. at 1192.
108. Id. at 1192-94.
109. Id. at 1193. In support, the Tenth Circuit quoted Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003): "once the... copyright monopoly has expired, the public
may use the .. .work at will and without attribution." Golan, 501 F.3d at 1183 (alteration in
original).
110. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1193. The court also cited several cases in support of the proposition
that "artistic expression is near the core of the First Amendment." Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1194.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. The court acknowledged the contrary view. See id. ("In general, the democratic dia-
logue-a self-governing people's participation in the marketplace of ideas-is adequately served
if the public has access to an author's ideas, and such loss to the dialogue as results from inacces-
sibility to an author's 'expression' is counterbalanced by the greater public interest in the copy-
right system." (quoting 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 19E.03[A][2], at 19E-20 to -21)).
116. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1195.
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Amendment protections for certain institutions or businesses."17 The
Tenth Circuit was similarly dissatisfied with the URAA provisions al-
lowing a reliance party to use a work for one year after receiving no-
tice.118 As with the idea/expression and fair use provisions, the
statute's safe harbor for reliance parties did not provide a "guarantee
of breathing space." 1 9 The Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court to review, under the First Amendment, whether section
514 was content-neutral or content-based, and then apply either inter-
mediate or strict scrutiny. 120
IV. ANALYSIS
The Golan court properly found that copyright's built-in safeguards
were not designed to combat section 514's threat to free expression,
where removal of works from the public domain interfered with the
plaintiffs' ability to communicate through the unrestricted use of these
works. 121 This Part explores how artists and creators use public do-
main works and argues that the restoration of copyright restricts free
expression by placing limits on how creators can use works in the pub-
lic domain. This Part first explores how the First Amendment protects
artistic expression. 22 This Part, in Sections B and C, further argues
for a more realistic view of how creators make use of preexisting
117. Id. The court recounted the additional safeguards of the CTEA:
First, [the CTEA] allows libraries, archives, and similar institutions to "reproduce" and
"distribute, display, or perform in facsimile or digital form" copies of certain published
works "during the last 20 years of any term of copyright . . . for purposes of preserva-
tion, scholarship, or research" if the work is not already being exploited commercially
and further copies are unavailable at a reasonable price. 17 U.S.C. § 108(h). Second,
Title II of the CTEA, known as the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, exempts
small businesses, restaurants, and like entities from having to pay performance royalties
on music played from licensed radio, television, and similar facilities.
Id. at 1195-96 (alterations in original) (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003)).
118. Id. at 1196.
119. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
120. Id. According to the court, content-based restrictions are those that "suppress, disadvan-
tage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content." Id. (quoting Grace
United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 657 (10th Cir. 2006)). Content-
based restrictions require a court "to consider whether the government's interest in promulgat-
ing the legislation is truly 'compelling' and whether the government might achieve the same ends
through means that have less of an effect on protected expression." Id. (citing United States v.
Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)). Alternatively, content-neutral regulation
"serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression ... even if it has an incidental effect on
some speakers or messages but not others." Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 391 U.S.
781, 791 (1989)). Content-neutral restrictions must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest." Id. (quoting Ward, 391 U.S. at 791).
121. See id. at 1194-95.
122. See infra notes 127-133 and accompanying text. The terms "right to expression" or "free
expression" here refer to the First Amendment right, which is distinct from the concept of "ex-
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works and contends that the public domain serves as a source for cre-
ators and as a vehicle of self-expression for performers.1 23 Next, this
Part discusses the general limits of the idea/expression dichotomy and
the fair use doctrine in addressing First Amendment interests. 24 This
Part then contrasts the First Amendment arguments in Eldred v. Ash-
croft and argues that section 514 of the URAA is an imposition on the
speech of individuals who have already engaged with artistic works in
the public domain. 125 Finally, this Part considers how section 514 lim-
its the self-expression of individuals who rely on the public domain as
a zone where copyright law imposes no burdens on the creative
process. 1
2 6
A. First Amendment Protection for Use of Public Domain Works
Copyright law balances the rights of copyright owners with the pub-
lic's interest in eventually receiving the work to use freely and without
restrictions. 127 As a policy matter, section 514 places the interests of
copyright owners above the interest of individuals to use public do-
main materials on their own terms. 128 Beyond policy, however, sec-
tion 514 interferes with the creative process of individuals who rely on
the public domain as a source of artistic material. In constitutional
terms, section 514 frustrates the free expression of creators, perform-
ers, and others who rely on access to works in the public domain.
Artistic expression is at the core of First Amendment protection,
and the Tenth Circuit's reiteration of this principle rests on solid pre-
cedent.' 29 First Amendment protection for artistic expression persists
pressive works" or "expression," which are generally distinguished from ideas in the idea/expres-
sion dichotomy.
123. See infra notes 134-181 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 182-202 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 203-233 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 234-251 and accompanying text.
127. See Zimmerman, supra note 22, at 302-03.
128. See Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854, 2005 WL 914754, at *18 (D. Colo. Apr. 20,
2005), affd in part and remanded in part, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007) ("It remained at all
times within Congress' authority to rectify the unfairness with which foreign authors were
afflicted.").
129. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007). The Tenth Circuit cited several
Supreme Court opinions that recognize a First Amendment protection for "music," Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781. 790 (1989); "entertainment," Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981); and "pictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings,"
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973). Golan, 501 F.3d at 1193. Ward involved a
constitutional challenge by sponsors of a musical event at a park to guidelines for using a band
shell in the park. The particular performance at the event included rock music and speeches
with an anti-racism message. Ward, 491 U.S. at 784-90. The Court noted that "the perform-
ances apparently consisted of remarks by speakers, as well as rock music, but the case has been
presented as one in which the constitutional challenge is to the city's regulation of the musical
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in court decisions despite conflicting theories of the First Amend-
ment. 130 Moreover, courts will not consider the quality of ideas or
opinions a work of art expresses, even if a particular work expresses
no discernable idea or an idea that a judge might find repugnant. 131 In
a case involving the constitutionality of a law that banned certain
forms of nude dancing, Judge Posner explained:
[E]ven if "thought," "concept," "idea," and "opinion" are broadly
defined, these are not what most music conveys; and even if music is
regarded as a language, it is not a language for encoding ideas and
opinions. Insofar as it is more than beautiful sound patterns, music,
like striptease, organizes, conveys, and arouses emotion, though not
sexual emotion primarily. If the striptease dancing ... is not expres-
sion, Mozart's piano concertos and Balanchine's most famous bal-
lets are not expression.1 32
Judge Posner's statements about art's power to convey ideas are cer-
tainly debatable, but his statement reinforces the fundamental princi-
pal that the artistic expression that the First Amendment protects is
not limited to art with a discernable message. By this view, the First
Amendment makes no inquiry into the communicative message of ar-
tistic expression-it does not require a court to determine what a pi-
anist really communicates when she plays a Mozart sonata, or whether
John Blackburn makes a particular comment through his Shos-
takovich arrangement set to commemorate 9/11.133
aspects of the concert," and thus the Court reviewed the regulation under the First Amendment.
Id. at 790. The Supreme Court recognized the communicative power of artistic expression:
"[f]rom Plato's discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times, rulers have
known [music's] capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the emotions, and have censored musi-
cal compositions to serve the needs of the state." Id.
130. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 538 (describing various views of the First Amendment).
Professor Alexander Meiklejohn has rationalized the protection for art based on its value to
democracy. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT.
REV. 245, 256-57; see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitu-
tionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 33-39 (2002) (criticizing the self-expression and democratic govern-
ance models and advocating for a First Amendment rationale based on the "freedom of
imagination"). These analyses contrast with Melville Nimmer's more limited view of the First
Amendment's role in copyright law. Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1189 (1970) (arguing
that a robust "democratic dialogue" is preserved as long as individuals can have free access to
ideas).
131. See Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glenn Theater Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
132. Id. at 1093.
133. Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 16; see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright
Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 34 (2001).
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B. The Creative Process: The Public Domain as Source
The use of preexisting expressive works is essential to self expres-
sion.1 3 4 To understand how section 514 impinges on the First Amend-
ment rights of individuals using preexisting material, one must first
appreciate how individuals interact with public domain works and
how these works are important to their speech. The inquiry here fo-
cuses on those creators who use public domain works for the purpose
of making new creations and those individuals whose interest lies in
performance and dissemination of works in the public domain. The
communicative effect of using preexisting material is not limited by
the type of material a creator uses, but the following analysis centers
on the use of preexisting musical works, which relates to the facts in
Golan that primarily involve musical composers and performers. The
Tenth Circuit rightly supports a more realistic view of the author's
creative process and the important First Amendment interest in a do-
main consisting of the "raw materials of authorship. 1' 35
Section 514 removed works from the public domain in the fields of
music, literature, and film, despite the public domain's importance to
individuals who draw on existing source material to create new
works. 136 Courts, at least as far back as 1845, have recognized the
necessity of copying as part of the creative process.1 37 The Golan de-
cision promotes a more accurate view of the artistic use of public do-
main materials, the public domain's importance to authors who use
preexisting material, and the expressive value of using this material.
A common example of the interplay between copying and creation
is a musical arrangement, where a composer uses another work as a
base and arranges the composition for a different medium, sometimes
by changing aspects of the music itself or sometimes by arranging the
written music for a different performing instrument or ensemble.' 38
134. Tushnet, supra note 50, at 538.
135. See Litman, supra note 26, at 967-68.
136. See id. at 968 (arguing that the public domain is not a "sphere for insignificant contribu-
tions" and that its "central purpose" is to "promot[e] the enterprise of authorship").
137. Justice Story initially provided the reasoning, and the Supreme Court has recently reiter-
ated his statements:
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things,
which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in
literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which
was well known and used before.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569. 575 (1994) (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F.
Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass. 1845) (Story, J.)); see also Litman, supra note 26, at 966
(noting that the necessity of using the material of others is a "truism").
138. See THE HARVARD DICTIONARY OF Music 58 (Don Michael Randel ed., 4th ed. 2003)
(defining "arrangement" as "[tihe adaptation of a composition for a medium different from that
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Consider John Blackburn, the plaintiff in Golan who prepared an ar-
rangement of Shostakovich's Fifth Symphony for a high school
band. 39 In the process of creating his new work based on what was at
one time a public domain work, Blackburn copied portions of Shos-
takovich's orchestral score. 140 In addition to the outright copying of
Shostakovich's melodies, harmonies, and rhythms, Blackburn made
decisions about which wind instruments should play particular parts in
the orchestral score, whether certain note doublings and harmonies
should be left out, and whether certain melody or accompaniment
lines should be transferred up or down octaves. 141 With these and
many other decisions, Blackburn created his composition, which was
made possible by his ability to copy substantially from the underlying
Shostakovich symphony.142
An arrangement is not a rare form of creation in which creators
copy from an underlying work. The creative process is often a process
of copying existing expression. 143 For written music, arrangement is
one compositional technique of many that involves significant copying
of another's work.144 Musicologist J. Peter Burkholder has developed
a typology of musical borrowing in written music based on his studies
of composer Charles Ives, who borrowed extensively throughout his
compositions. 45 Burkholder identifies at least fourteen different
types of borrowing found in Ives's music, including categories of bor-
rowing that, similar to a traditional arrangement, simultaneously re-
quire significant reliance on source material and the composer's
unique input.146
for which it was originally composed, usually with the intention of preserving the essentials of
the musical substance; also the result of such a process of adaptation").
139. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007).
140. Id. There are no facts in the record that Mr. Blackburn made physical copies of the
score, but implicit in every arrangement is the direct copying (to varying degrees) of preexisting
material.
141. The details of Mr. Blackburn's arrangement are unknown, but arrangements can vary
significantly in their faithfulness to the underlying work. See Malcolm Boyd, Arrangement, 2
THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 66 (Stanley Sadie ed., 2d ed. 2001)
(noting that for arrangements "recomposition is usually involved, and the result may vary from a
straightforward, almost literal, transcription to a paraphrase which is more the work of the ar-
ranger than of the original composer").
142. Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 16. Mr. Blackburn chose the Shostakovich work be-
cause he thought it was unencumbered by copyright. Id.
143. Cohen, supra note 31, at 157-60 ("[Cjopying, reworking, and derivation are not periph-
eral or inauthentic activities, but lie at the core of creative practice however it is defined.").
144. See J. Peter Burkholder, Borrowing, 4 THE NEw GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND
MUSICIANS 5 (Stanley Sadie ed., 2d ed. 2001).
145. See J. Peter Burkholder, The Uses of Existing Music: Musical Borrowing as a Field, 50
NOTES 851 (1994).
146. Id. at 854.
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Consider the compositional technique that Burkholder describes as
cumulative setting, where "the theme, either a borrowed tune or a
melody paraphrased from one or more existing tunes, is presented
complete only near the end of a movement, preceded by development
of motives from the theme, fragmentary or altered presentation of the
theme, and exposition of important countermelodies. ' ' 147 A composer
employing this technique must at some point select the underlying
composition, choose fragments to incorporate, and then combine
these fragments together with newly composed music. The selection
and reflection of existing material, and reflection of how to incorpo-
rate it are essential steps of the creative process, throughout which the
composer has an acute awareness of the preexisting work.148
Composers from all periods created works by using certain common
forms and techniques throughout their compositions.1 49 The borrow-
ing Burkholder describes is fundamentally different, as the composer
creates in reference to preexisting, copyrightable material. This bor-
rowing is more than an allusion to a specific musical era or the use of a
common musical form. Moreover, the identified borrowing tech-
niques are not unique to a single composer's music, and diverse prac-
tices of borrowing exist for various composers, periods, and styles.150
From Bach to Brahms to the Beastie Boys, the practice of borrowing,
or sampling, is prevalent in various Western musical traditions. 51
Though sampling of recorded music may be a novel issue for courts,
hip hop DJs continue a long tradition of using existing music. 152
147. Id.
148. See Burkholder, supra note 144 (describing several ways in which the borrowed material
affects the "shape" of the new work). For example, the preexisting work "provides the structure,
virtually unaltered, but other features are changed enough to create a new entity"; the work
"forms the basis of the structure or of a melodic line, with new material added or interpolated
trope"; or the work can be "used as a theme, including extension and development for varia-
tions." Id.
149. See id. at 5 (noting that "all music draws on the repertory of notes, scales, gestures and
other elements available in that tradition, so that every piece borrows from earlier pieces in its
own tradition" and thus the "history of borrowing in music is the history of improvisation, com-
position and performance").
150. See id. at 8-36 (tracing practices of musical borrowing from medieval music to modern
day jazz and popular music); see also Musical Borrowing: An Annotated Bibliography (J. Peter
Burkholder et al. eds), http://www.chmtl.indiana.edu/borrowing (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (col-
lecting print material that discusses musical borrowing, with the ultimate goal of creating "a
comprehensive, indexed, and annotated bibliography of published materials and theses relating
to the use of existing music in the tradition of Western music"). The site has a feature that
allows users to enter terms and search the full text of the annotations. Each annotation includes
a listing of "works" and "sources" listing the referenced musical works. Musical Borrowing: An
Annotated Bibliography, supra.
151. See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 22 (2008).
152. See id.
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The way the composer interacts with the source material is varied
and can be quite complex, and the various methods of borrowing may
also have diverse and complex communicative significance. 53 A crea-
tor's use of a particular work, and the way the composer uses it, may
communicate the author's reverence, disdain, or simple acknowledge-
ment of what has come before. 154 That is, the selection and treatment
of the source material can be a deliberate communicative act beyond
the mere repetition of what the underlying work communicates. 155
The ways composers place borrowed material, such as juxtaposition of
certain melodies or certain rhythmic figures, and the method by which
composers change the underlying material, have expressive meaning
to composers and audiences.' 5 6
Of course, the borrowed material itself has communicative signifi-
cance for anyone experiencing the work, and this significance may
change with time.157 Borrowing from a particular work, like the use of
153. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 568 ("Copyrighted works often serve as the self-expression
of someone other than the author; they can both feel like the products of the copier's own
personality and be perceived by others as such.").
154. See, e.g., Charles Rosen, Influence: Plagiarism and Inspiration, 19TH CENTURY MUSIC,
Oct. 1980, at 94 (analyzing the borrowing of several composers with a side-by-side comparison of
their musical notation). Rosen describes possible meaning of the borrowing of Brahms:
Influence for Brahms was not merely a part of the compositional process, a necessary
fact of creative life: he incorporated it as part of the symbolic structure of the work, its
iconography. We might even conjecture that the overt references are often there as
signals, to call attention to others less obvious, almost undetectable.
Id.
155. For example, Carter Pann borrowed the familiar opening motive of the second move-
ment of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony in the opening of his work, SLALOM. See Carter Pann:
SLALOM, http://www.carterpann.com/worksslalom-orchestra.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
The source material has a particular significance to the composer, who explains that his work "is
a taste of the thrill of downhill skiing" that "came directly out of a wonderful discovery I made
several years ago... when I embarked on the mountain-base gondola with a cassette player and
headphones" while listening to classical music. Id. Pann found that "[t]he exhilaration of barrel-
ing down the Rockies with such music pumping into my ears was overwhelming," and "[a]fter
skiing with some of the greatest repertoire," he decided to "customize the experience" by writing
the piece. Id.
156. See Burkholder, supra note 144, at 7. Burkholder describes how the extent of the bor-
rowing can alter meaning:
Listeners respond differently and attribute different meanings to music that borrows
the full texture of another piece, as does Stravinsky's Pulcinella; a melodic line, such as
the Russian folktunes in his Petrushka; a texture, as in the evocation of Debussy's
Nuages at the opening of Part II of The Rite of Spring; or an instrumental colour, such
as the english horn in the latter at the "Ritual Action of the Ancestors," again echoing
Nuages.
Id. at 8.
157. See, e.g., id. at 8 ("Haydn's . . . 'Emperor' Quartet . . .would have been hard to hear
during World War II without thinking of Deutschland iiber alles, the German anthem on the
same melody, and the ideology of the Nazi government, lending the work potential meanings
that Haydn could not have envisaged.").
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particular musical styles, forms, or instrumentation, may also allow an
audience to understand a new work if they are familiar with the bor-
rowed material.158 The expressive value of the underlying work may
not be identical for creator and audience and the meaning can change
with time, but the expressive value persists as part of the borrowing.159
The public domain is a storehouse of expressive works that facili-
tates and encourages musical borrowing.160 The recognition that cre-
ators, even masters of particular genres, are copiers emphasizes the
importance of the public domain for all authors.161 The public domain
is not a crutch for uncreative authors and composers. Viewing the
creative process realistically, a reduction in access to works in the pub-
lic domain limits the compositional choices of all creators. 162 Though
a creator could use other works in the public domain, it is no answer
to say that a composer interested in Shostakovich should just borrow
from Beethoven. Section 514 reduced the possibility of creators' ex-
pression by removing works from the public domain that could serve a
unique role in the creative process.
C. The Expressive Value of Performance and Distribution of Works
in the Public Domain
The public domain is more than a source for artists to create new
works. Works that pass into the public domain have value as building
blocks, but these works-films, books, and musicals scores-also have
value separate from the creations they inspire. 63 Copyright law regu-
158. See id. at 7 (noting that extra-musical associations vary with the listener); see also infra
note 159 and accompanying text. Conversely, an unexpected juxtaposition of new and familiar
borrowed material can shock the listener.
159. See Norman Kay, Shostakovich 15th Symphony, 100 TEMPO 36, 37-38 (1972) (noting that
Shostakovich's borrowed a famous theme from Rossini's William Tell overture in his Fifteenth
Symphony). Kay, a musicologist, explains that Shostakovich borrows from William Tell "incon-
gruously," and that "every other motive in the piece radiates from [the borrowing] and returns
to it by way of intervallic shape." Id.; cf. James Wierzbicki, Sound Familiar? Rules Are Fuzzy on
Music Quotes, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 21, 1993, at 4C (relating the William Tell quota-
tion to its use in The Lone Ranger radio and television show). Mr. Wierzbicki comments:
"Scholars tell us that this note-for-note citation, like the symphony's allusions to works by
Tchaikovsky, Mahler and Wagner, is a kind of memorial to one of Shostakovich's heroes. Was
the hero Rossini, one has to ask, or was it perhaps the Lone Ranger?" Id.
160. See Litman, supra note 26, at 967.
161. See NETANEL, supra note 151, at 22.
162. Certainly, not every act of borrowing constitutes copyright infringement. Some copying
may be de minimis or even unrecognizable. See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th
Cir. 2004) (finding Beastie Boy's six second sampling of James Newton's written work, "Choir,"
was de minimis because the average audience would not recognize the borrowing). If borrowing
is viewed as a range, however, de minimis use counts for only a miniscule portion of this range,
and authors can borrow much more extensively from public domain works.
163. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 569.
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lates the activities of the music publisher and community orchestra
plaintiffs in Golan, as the performers and distributors were using
copyrighted material after section 514 restored copyrights to foreign
artistic works. 164 By encouraging performance and distribution of
public domain works, the public domain promotes speech.
An individual will often copy musical recordings, books, and films
so that a secondary user can experience the expressive value of the
copied material, as when a person copies a CD for later listening. Mu-
sical scores, however, serve as instructions for artistic performance,
and performance is an expressive and creative endeavor.165 People
often buy multiple recordings of the same work and attend concerts of
music that they have heard before to appreciate even subtle differ-
ences in performances. 166 Audience members leave a concert and de-
bate the performers' (re)creation of the works they have just heard. 167
Performers emulate past performances of the same works because a
particular performer's interpretation may be as important as the
works performed. 6 In these examples, the performance, or more ac-
curately the interpretation, can be separated from the underlying
work, but copyright law regulates the performance in connection to
the copyrighted work.169
The public domain attracts performers. 170 The late Richard Kapp, a
Golan plaintiff, was a pianist and conductor of the Philharmonia Vur-
tuosi, a New York orchestra. 171 Mr. Kapp programmed musical works
164. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 13-19.
165. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 50, at 570-71 (noting the expressive value in various per-
formances of a play).
166. See id. at 569; see also, e.g., Stephen Johnson, The Eighth Wonder, GRAMOPHONE, July
2006, at 29, 30 (comparing 20 recordings of Shostakovich's Eighth Symphony). The author de-
scribes the communicative force of one recording:
Even the brooding circular movement of the passacaglia is purposeful-a quiet, patient
working-through of powerful emotions in a highly contained musical form .... Several
performances flag at the start of the finale but Jirvi [the orchestra conductor] finds a
rich vein of straight-faced nocturnal humour here, surfacing again in the delicious bass
clarinet and violin solos near the end.
Johnson, supra, at 31.
167. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 569 ("Each new performance produces a different effect
on the audience because each represents the artist's self-expression; the copy bears the unique
marks of its copying.").
168. See Guy Trebay, A Judy is Born, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2006, § 9, at 1 (describing how
singer-songwriter Rufus Wainwright recently recreated Judy Garland's famous 1961 Carnegie
Hall performance, "the event that cemented her legend as a singer and star and elevated her to
the pantheon of the unvanquished, where she steadfastly remains").
169. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
170. See, e.g., STEPHEN FISHMAN, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: How TO FIND AND USE COPYRIGHT-
FREE WRITINGS, MusIc, ART & MORE 39 (2006).
171. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 14-15: see also Daniel J. Wakin, Richard Kapp, 69,
Innovative Conductor, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, at C13 (Kapp's obituary).
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in the public domain for performances and recordings for over thirty-
five years because, as he explained, copyrighted works impose signifi-
cant performance fees and higher sheet music rental costs than public
domain works. 172 The majority of works his orchestra played came
from the public domain, but the restoration of these copyrights ren-
dered the performance of some of these works cost-prohibitive and
thus reduced the communicative possibilities of his orchestra. 73 Like
Mr. Kapp, church musicians, community orchestras, performance en-
sembles in schools, instructors, or performers starting their careers can
use the public domain as a vital resource.174 These performances of
the work also have communicative value as part of a series of
performances.175
The public domain also encourages investment and distribution of
public domain works, as it attracts music publishers who distribute
those works exclusively. 7 6 Moreover, internet archives collect public
domain materials for quick and inexpensive access by the public.177
The First Amendment interests of distributors are not as immediate as
those of creators and performers who rely on the public domain, but
distribution is particularly important to free and open discourse.178
Also, selecting particular works, placing them in specific volumes, and
arranging these works for performance can communicate something
about the compiler's view of the underlying works chosen. 179 The
172. Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 14.
173. Id. at 14-15 (explaining that copyright restoration limits the pool of music from which the
orchestra can draw, with the restoration of copyright to works by Prokofiev, Shostakovich,
Vainberg, and Schnittke).
174. See Paul J. Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy
Machines, and New Arrangements of Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241 (1996).
175. See PAUL GRIFFITHS, MODERN MUSIC AND AFTER 483 (1995) (quoting Stravinsky, who
contended that "fifty recordings of the Beethoven symphony are fifty different angles of distor-
tion: the larger the variorum, the greater the guarantee that Beethoven himself will remain
intact"); see also Tushnet, supra note 50, at 571 (noting that the many productions of a play gain
meaning in reference to each other).
176. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 15 (explaining that music distributor plaintiffs
Luck's Music Library and Edwin F. Kalmus "have ... had to eliminate significant portions of
their holdings and are no longer able to distribute many important cultural works").
177. See Internet Archive, About the Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/about/
about.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) ("The Internet Archive is a 501(c)(3) non-profit that was
founded to build an Internet library, with the purpose of offering permanent access for research-
ers, historians, and scholars to historical collections that exist in digital format.").
178. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 565.
179. See id. at 571. The organization of some volumes may not be surprising: Beethovens
Complete Sonatas, Chopin's Scherzos, or The Complete String Quartets of Shostakovich. Other
volumes involve significant editorial choice: Brahms Pieces to Play Before His Major Works,
The Greatest Piano Pieces of All Time, or Russian Masters at the Piano. Moreover, a publisher
can communicate his views about the importance of particular works by simply choosing to pub-
lish the work. For example, if Kalmus publishes a volume of Beethoven's Piano Sonatas, but
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typeface of musical volumes and the meticulous editing, or lack
thereof, may also communicate something to the players who use the
works. 180 The public domain is not a place where works go to die;
investment and distribution in the public domain can be an expressive
act and can further encourage expression by the performers and cre-
ators who are the beneficiaries of investment.18'
D. The Limits of Copyright's Built-In Safeguards
In light of the ways artists use preexisting material for self-expres-
sion, copyright law, by allowing for a monopoly over certain forms of
expression for a limited time, presents an impediment to free
speech. 182 Specifically, copyright owners have a limited right to pre-
vent a creator or performer from using the copyrighted material. 83
The Tenth Circuit's First Amendment analysis for section 514 and
other copyright statutes is framed by its reliance on copyright's built-
in safeguards-the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine. 184
These two doctrines should not end the inquiry in every case, espe-
cially in the context of the public domain, as the First Amendment
exists beyond the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.
The idea/expression dichotomy allows for only a limited class of
free speech and is inadequate to address the expressive interests of the
Golan plaintiffs.18 5 The idea/expression dichotomy does little to pro-
tect an individual's First Amendment interest in the particular lines of
separately publishes Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata and the Pathetiqud Sonata, the publisher
communicates to the potential buyer that these works are compositionally important, pleasing to
listeners, or at least popular with players.
180. See generally Heald, supra note 174 (analyzing the standards of originality for publishers
who register copyrights for their reproductions of public domain sheet music).
181. See Ochoa, supra note 22, at 256 (describing how those advocating strong intellectual
property rights exaggerate in describing the public domain as a "black hole").
182. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 540 (noting that a successful copyright infringement suit
can prevent the defendant from "printing, performing, or otherwise disseminating certain
works"). Copyright law, by giving authors "the exclusive right to their respective writings," in-
herently conflicts with the First Amendment's general prohibition of laws "abridging the free-
dom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
183. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); see also 3 NuMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 8.15 (describ-
ing how the 1909 Copyright Act did not give copyright holders an exclusive right to nonprofit
performances of their works).
184. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1178, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 2007).
185. See Netanel, supra note 133, at 16-17 (noting that, because of the expansive power given
to a copyright holder, if a defendant's "reformulation, adaptation, or other such derivative work
is deemed to appropriate the copyright holder's 'expression,' not just 'idea,' the defendant may
be held liable," even if the defendant adds "considerable creative input" and his or her work
"can be said to resemble the original only at a fairly high level of abstraction").
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a poem or the melodic lines of a sonata. 186 For example, an individual
may be able to explain the meaning or idea of a Shostakovich sym-
phony, but her description may not accurately or coherently convey a
specific meaning without use of the underlying expression. 187 Moreo-
ver, the First Amendment protects a speaker's particular expression of
an idea, and courts do not ask whether the speaker could express him-
self in another way because there is First Amendment value in expres-
sion.188 As Professor Tushnet explains, copying expression is
prohibited "not because expression is unimportant to the free flow of
ideas, as the idea/expression dichotomy suggests, but because it is so
important that it must be encouraged by state-backed legal protec-
tions.1 89 Protection for the public domain is vitally important be-
cause those who use public domain works can freely express
themselves by using the expression-not just the ideas-from works
in the public domain.
The fair use doctrine functions as a First Amendment safeguard by
allowing an individual to use copyrighted material in ways that would
otherwise infringe copyright. 190 Specifically, the fair use doctrine pro-
vides additional protection beyond the idea/expression dichotomy for
those who use the expressive components of works. 191 Besides being
"even more notoriously opaque than the idea/expression distinc-
tion," 192 the statutory fair use test often values certain types of copy-
186. See id. at 15-17 (providing several examples from case law where the speaker's use of an
underlying text was not "absolutely necessary," but would be less effective or believable without
the underlying material).
187. Id. at 14. The classic case is Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, which involved an
amateur film of the Kennedy assassination. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130,
131 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In a book criticizing a government report about the shooting, a university
professor included a few frames from the film. Id. at 132. Time had obtained the rights to the
film and sued for copyright infringement. Id. at 131. Though the university professor could have
relied on his own description of the film, he would have been unable to capture the raw power of
the famous event as authentically or clearly as the film footage itself. Netanel, supra note 133, at
14.
188. See Rubenfeld, supra note 130, at 14-16.
189. Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in
Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications
Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000).
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
191. See, e.g., Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2007). The Tenth Circuit
relied on the preamble of the statute, which provides, at the least, a starting point. The statute
specifically describes the fair use defense as important to "reproduction in copies ... for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for class-
room use), scholarship, or research." 17 U.S.C. § 107.
192. Rubenfeld, supra note 130, at 16. Both the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
doctrine "have the virtue of flexibility," but the required case-by-case application also leaves
creators and speakers unable to predict whether a particular use is an infringing use. Tushnet,
supra note 50, at 554.
20081
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ing such as parody, criticism, or transformative uses.1 93 Yet, the
simple copying of a work-pure copying that includes the use of ex-
pressive content-can be core First Amendment speech.194 Though
the fair use doctrine may be necessary to protect First Amendment
concerns, fair use is not sufficient to preserve the First Amendment
whenever Congress enacts a copyright statute. 195
The Supreme Court has recognized one work's parody of a copy-
righted work can be fair use, 196 and courts applying the fair use analy-
sis have consistently focused on whether a secondary use is
transformative of the preexisting material.197 Importantly, the focus
on transformation is an acknowledgement that there is expressive
value in using a preexisting work. 198 If the focus on transformation
becomes a focus on the criticism or parody of the underlying work, as
some scholars have warned, then the First Amendment protection of
the public domain is all the more important. 199
193. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 558 (arguing that because "transformative uses fit comfort-
ably in an older, constitutionalized discourse about criticism, contrarianism, protest, offensive-
ness, and unpopularity . . . it lacks any ability to defend pure copying on First Amendment
grounds and thus cedes a large segment of formerly fair uses to copyright owners").
194. Id. at 562.
195. See id. at 568-74 (describing several situations where the use of another's expression
serves the creative interests of the secondary speaker); see also Matthew Sag, God in the Ma-
chine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 381, 408-10 (2005) (arguing that fair use is not a necessary or inevitable feature of
copyright law in the abstract, but may nonetheless be constitutionally required given the current
breadth of copyright protection).
196. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The Supreme Court found
that the rap group 2 Live Crew's song, "Pretty Woman," which parodied Orbison's "Oh, Pretty
Woman" was fair use because, inter alia, the work was transformative. The Court stated that it
"might not assign a high rank to the parodic element" of 2 Live Crew's song, but that the song
"reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it." Id. at 583.
197. See id.; Pierre N. Leval, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111
(1990) ("A quotation of copyrighted material that merely repackages or republishes the original
is unlikely to pass the test .... [I]f the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings-this is the very
type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.").
198. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581-83 (discussing how the parodying work commented
on the preexisting work).
199. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy, in his Campbell concur-
rence, indicated his unease with an expansive view of transformative use:
We should not make it easy for musicians to exploit existing works and then later claim
that their rendition was a valuable commentary on the original. Almost any revamped
modern version of a familiar composition can be construed as a "comment on the na-
ivete of the original" . If we allow any weak transformation to qualify as parody,
however, we weaken the protection of copyright. And underprotection of copyright
disserves the goals of copyright just as much as overprotection, by reducing the finan-
cial incentive to create.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 599 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
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Even if courts construe transformative use more broadly, however,
restoring copyright to a work that a creator uses significantly narrows
the range of expression for those creators whose work is not deemed
transformative. Though a particular author's use of material may not
be transformative, there is still expressive value in his use of preexist-
ing artistic material.200 The fair use test is not a measuring stick for
the communicative value of using preexisting material. Even if a work
is sufficiently transformative, the statutory fair use test is guided by
other considerations besides transformation, so that a use may not be
fair even if it is transformative.20 1 Finally, separating weak transfor-
mation from other transformation may be appropriate for a fair use
inquiry, but the amount of transformation should not serve as the sole
indicator of the First Amendment value of a work that uses preexist-
ing material. 20 2
E. Distinguishing Eldred: The Expressive Value of Interacting with
Public Domain Works
Despite the force of arguments that copyright's internal safety
valves are inadequate to address First Amendment concerns, the Su-
preme Court limited the First Amendment to the idea/expression di-
chotomy and the fair use doctrine in Eldred v. Ashcroft, finding that
copyright's internal safeguards generally protected First Amendment
concerns.2 0 3 Those individuals who have an interest in using works
with restored copyrights could rely on the idea/expression dichotomy
and fair use doctrine to vindicate their First Amendment rights, just as
Eric Eldred could for the extra twenty years he would have to wait for
a copyright to expire.20 4 In Golan, the Tenth Circuit sought to distin-
guish Eldred with respect to the First Amendment analysis by focusing
on the plaintiffs' unique interests in using expressive works available
in the public domain.205 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit focused on the
200. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 559-60.
201. See Sag, supra note 195, at 424 (identifying other "guiding principles" beyond transfor-
mation that are part of the fair use inquiry).
202. A non-transformative, but highly expressive, use may be at the core of the First Amend-
ment, just as a non-transformative use-such as making copies for classroom use-may be at the
core of the fair use doctrine. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 556, 567.
203. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
204. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186. 219-20 (2003).
205. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007). The Tenth Circuit hints that the
plaintiffs' interests in public domain materials are vested rights, as the Tenth Circuit explains that
"the speech at issue here belonged to plaintiffs when it entered the public domain," and that the
plaintiffs' performances and artistic productions were planned "in reliance on their rights to
these works." Id.
20081
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
process of interacting with expressive works in the public domain and
acquiring these works as one's own speech. 206
1. Communicating Through "Other People's Speeches"
All creators build on preexisting speech, and the public domain rep-
resents a domain of free material. 207 The creative process-copying,
reworking, and reinterpreting existing expression-is uninhibited in
the public domain.20 8 Like libel and obscenity laws, copyright laws
are an exception to the First Amendment: they limit speech but are
nonetheless constitutional.20 9 Even if the idea/expression dichotomy
and the fair use doctrine generally protect First Amendment interests,
these safeguards are not the lone protectors of free speech interests.
The public domain of expressive works is built into the system of cop-
yright law and individuals can use public domain works to express
themselves without the normal constraints of copyright.
Individuals who rely on public domain works use those works with-
out having to obtain permission from a copyright owner, without con-
sidering the extent of their borrowing, and without running the risk of
an infringement suit.210 When a composer creates a new work in ref-
erence to an existing work, the selection of the new work may be
based in part on the work's public domain status.211 Similarly, per-
formers may consider the status of the musical works which they per-
form and what royalties are associated with their performances or
recordings. 212 The use of a public domain work is as close as a person
may get to a guarantee of absolutely uncontested use, and technology
206. Id. at 1193-94. The focus on the Tenth Circuit's reasoning is not meant to take away
from the force of the arguments that an act of copying (even for copyrighted material) is speech.
Rather, this Section discusses the interests of creators in the public domain, while acknowledging
the limits of Eldred, which the Tenth Circuit had to distinguish in order to ever reach the First
Amendment review claim. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 547 (arguing that courts should recog-
nize the First Amendment value in pure copying).
207. Litman, supra note 26, at 967.
208. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003)
("[O]nce the ... copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the ... work at will and
without attribution.").
209. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After
Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REV. 697, 713 (2003).
210. See FISHMAN, supra note 170, at 2-3.
211. Though the status of a particular work is not always easily ascertained, the Internet pro-
vides a wealth of information (some specific to a particular field). See, e.g., Copyright Term and
the Public Domain in the United States, http://www.copyright.cornell.edu/publicdomain/ (last
visited Nov. 1, 2008) (providing a detailed list of public domain works arranged by type and
country of publication).
212. See FISHMAN, supra note 170, at 94.
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allows for quick and inexpensive identification and access to public
domain sources.213
The plaintiffs in Eldred argued that the CTEA, by turning off the
flow of works into the public domain, interfered with their First
Amendment rights.214 Section 514 of the URAA, in contrast, re-
moved works from the public domain that already served as the raw
materials of authorship. 215 Authors already put these works to use.
The Golan plaintiffs were not asserting a right to use other people's
speech; rather, the plaintiffs argued that section 514 interfered with
their speech. 216 The Golan plaintiffs' expression may have encom-
passed Shostakovich's symphonies and Prokofiev's Peter and the Wolf,
but the expression of these works in a new composition or as part of a
performance was wholly the speech of the plaintiffs. 217
An individual speaks her own speech when she copies preexisting
material, and her expressive interest develops through the various
ways she uses material.218 A composition can be dissected to reveal
the borrowed portions and the performer's interpretation can be sepa-
rated from the underlying source, but this separation tells little about
the expressive value of the composition or performance. 219 The ex-
pressive force of the work is the product of the interaction between
preexisting and new material, and sometimes the combination of the
new and old is the most effective way to communicate. 220
In the "Yes We Can" presidential campaign video for Senator Ba-
rack Obama, for example, celebrities and musicians mix their own
voices and original music with a stump speech in which Obama re-
peatedly announces, "Yes We Can!"221 The creator of the video,
213. See, e.g., The Mutopia Project: Free Sheet Music For Everyone, http://www.ibiblio.org/
mutopia (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (compiling over 1000 musical compositions in PDF form,
available for download).
214. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
215. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007).
216. See id. (explaining that the speech "belonged to the plaintiffs" when it entered the public
domain).
217. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 17 (describing how the Lamont Symphony Orches-
tra and the Portland Ballet owned and would borrow sheet music for public domain works, but
now cannot perform the works because the groups are required to obtain a license for dramatic
performances).
218. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 562 (discussing the expressive value of pure copying be-
yond the expressive value of using preexisting work in new works and performances).
219. See id.
220. See, e.g., id. at 573 (describing how Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in Texas v. Johnson
and "could think of no more eloquent way to argue for the value of the American flag than by
quoting John Greenleaf Whittier's poem Barbara Frietchie, among other sources whose repro-
duction added power to his argument").
221. Barack Obama: Change We Can Believe In, http://my.barackobama.com/page/invite/
yeswecanvideo (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
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will.i.am of the Black Eyed Peas, indicated that he "came up with the
idea to turn [Obama's] speech into a song . . . because that speech
[a]ffected and touched [his] inner core like nothing in a very long
time. '222 Though viewers' responses to the video are likely very dif-
ferent depending on their view of the candidate, viewers react to a
message that is the result of the interaction between new music, celeb-
rity voices and images, and the images and sounds of Barack Obama's
oration. 223 Though Obama's preexisting speech can be separated
from the new music, images, and sounds of the "Yes We Can" video,
the communicative significance-the First Amendment value-of the
video cannot rightly be categorized as the video creator's "own
speech" and "other people's speeches. '224 Similarly, though the Go-
lan plaintiffs' additions and interpretations can be separated from the
preexisting works they used, section 514 limits their free expression by
imposing limits on use of preexisting works they have used as part of
their own speech.
2. The Built-In Speech Benefits of the Public Domain
Eldred suggests that speech through copying of works protected by
copyright offends the rights of the copyright owner and weakens the
First Amendment interest asserted by creators.225 When works have
entered the public domain and creators interact with these works,
however, the rationale breaks down. The public domain does not op-
erate as a domain of other people's speeches; the public domain rep-
resents absence of ownership. 226
The Golan plaintiffs freely acquired works, but now they cannot
communicate using these works because the works' copyrights have
been restored. For example, plaintiff S.A. Publishing Co. had a com-
plete collection of Shostakovich's String Quartets on recording. 227
Section 514 restored the copyright for nine of these quartets, and the
Harry Fox Agency's demand for mechanical royalties of between
$1.25 and $1.50 per CD made the distribution of the CD recordings
222. Dipdive, Dipfinition: The Yes We Can Song, www.dipdive.com (last visited Nov. 1,
2008).
223. See id. The Obama video is not an example of a person's use of material in the public
domain. The example, however, illustrates that preexisting speech is vitally important to the
communicative act, and that the communicative message is impaired when use of the underlying
preexisting material is not possible.
224. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
225. Id.
226. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
227. Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 18.
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economically unfeasible. 228 Similarly, plaintiffs Ron Hall and John
McDonough own a film distribution business specializing in public do-
main films. 229 McDonough identified over fifty films that the business
owned outright that could no longer be distributed for sale and rental
to colleges, universities, and the general public. 230
These plaintiffs acquired and used unowned works in the public do-
main, but section 514 impeded their existing expressive interests that
developed when they invested in the works and distributed them.
Specifically, the First Amendment interests of these plaintiffs devel-
oped upon their use of unowned works, and section 514 interfered
with these First Amendment interests by restoring copyright owner-
ship and preventing further expression through the use of the restored
works.
The Golan plaintiffs could certainly rely on the idea/expression di-
chotomy and the fair use doctrine once the copyrights were restored
in the works they were using. Moreover, section 514 includes provi-
sions that lessened the burdens on speech. 231 But as the examples
above illustrate, these provisions do not adequately serve the First
Amendment interests of the Golan plaintiffs. When copyrights are
restored for public domain works, the more specific, limited idea/ex-
pression dichotomy and fair use doctrine cannot substitute for the un-
limited speech that the public domain provides. The Supreme Court
thus far has accepted or ignored the inadequacies of copyright's built-
in safeguards in protecting speech,232 but courts should not accept
these inadequacies for those who use public domain works. The
speech-enabling public domain acts together with copyright's internal
safeguards, but the public domain, by allowing for burden-free speech,
is a separate, essential feature of the balance between copyright laws
and the First Amendment. The Tenth Circuit correctly recognized this
when it reasoned that copyright's built-in safeguards were not de-
signed to address the First Amendment interests of the Golan plain-
tiffs. 233 Section 514 upsets the balance between copyright and the
First Amendment for the Golan plaintiffs, and copyright's internal
safeguards cannot restore stability.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 15.
230. Id. at 15, 19.
231. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
232. See Volokh, supra note 209, at 713-14 (explaining how copyright law can be viewed as an
exception to the First Amendment, justified by the Copyright Clause's command to provide
copyright protection as an incentive for authors to create new works).
233. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2007).
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F. Reliance on a Stable Public Domain
Those who acquire public domain works are not similarly situated
to those who acquire copyrighted works: those who use works in the
public domain are aware of the speech benefits of the public domain,
which shapes their expectations as to the acceptable uses of preexist-
ing works. That is, the public domain of expressive works is truly "a
place like home, where, when you go there, they have to take you in
and let you dance. '234 The Tenth Circuit's recognition of the First
Amendment value of the public domain is vitally important for cre-
ators who rely on the public domain.
Creators and performers cannot avoid considerations of copyright
law, and they interact very differently with works in the public domain
than with works still under copyright protection. The use of copy-
righted works involves considerations of copyright at all stages of cre-
ation. Creators are not unaware of what uses are permitted when
using works under copyright, as industry-specific standards provide
guidance for fair use in light of the uncertainty that arises in a case-by-
case application of the doctrine.235 Similarly, musical performers or
their representatives likely know the scope of public performance
rights. 236 In contrast, use of a public domain work involves, at most, a
single determination about a work's status.
Those individuals who use copyrighted works may be protected by
the fair use doctrine or the idea/expression dichotomy, or their use
might be so slight that it does not infringe the copyrights of preexist-
ing works.2 37 Of course, those who build on preexisting works would
likely prefer to use public domain works that are free for all. Golan is
important to the persistence of the public domain, however, not be-
cause the public domain is a magical place that benefits creators and
performers, but because the public domain serves an important source
function that enables and encourages free expression. 238 Interference
with the public domain-without a realistic assessment of the speech
234. See, e.g., Lange, supra note 32, at 470.
235. See, e.g., Ass'N OF INDEPENDENT FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS'
STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE, available at http:/www.centerforsocialmedia.org/
files/pdf/fair-use-final.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) [hereinafter FILMMAKERS' STATEMENT];
Electronic Frontier Foundation: Legal Guide for Bloggers, http://w2.eff.org/bloggers/lg (last vis-
ited Nov. 1, 2008); Daniel J. Cohen & Roy Rosenzweig, Digital History: A Guide to Gathering,
Presenting, and Preserving the Past on the Web, http://chnm.gmu.edu/digitalhistory/copyright/
5.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
236. See, e.g., Q & A About the ASCAP License Agreement for Symphony Orchestras, http://
www.ascap.com/licensing/pdfs/symphonic/faq.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
237. See Tushnet, supra note 50, at 582-84.
238. See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
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that the public domain facilitates-ignores the realities that creators
confront today.239
First Amendment protection of a robust public domain will not al-
ways alleviate the tension that creators feel when they use the works
of others. A particular author may want to use material from a work
that is still under copyright protection, and she will have to grapple
with whether her copying constitutes copyright infringement.240
Moreover, an author's choice of which material to copy, sample, and
borrow may not initially rest on whether the material is in the public
domain. For example, a composer who wants to quote, rework, and
improve upon a passage of his contemporary will borrow material
even though it is protected by copyright.24'
Still, the Golan decision is extremely important to those individuals
who use public domain material. Copyright's internal First Amend-
ment safeguards, while providing protection for free speech, also im-
pact the creative choices of those who use copyrighted works.242
Moreover, these safeguards and the test for infringement generally
are unpredictable, especially for close cases.243 The Statement of Best
Practices for Documentary Filmmakers, a particularly well-crafted ex-
ample of a practical guide for fair use that seeks to avoid some inde-
terminacy, provides guiding principles that limit the ways in which
filmmakers use copyrighted material in documentaries. 244 These prin-
ciples are helpful, but they may also direct the creative process away
from the artist's vision, and as a result the creative process will be
based on legal formalities. At best, creators can avoid altering their
artistic vision or changing their vision only slightly while staying cogni-
zant of the guidelines. 245 At worst, creators may drastically alter their
239. See supra notes 134-162 and accompanying text.
240. See Robert Kasunic, Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 397, 404 (2006) (arguing that fair use "tends to promote careful, minimalist speech rather
than robust free speech").
241. See, e.g., Burkholder, supra note 144, at 26-27 (describing Mozart's borrowing from his
contemporaries).
242. The argument here does not refer to the limits of the fair use doctrine and the idea/
expression dichotomy; rather, the argument is that these doctrines are no match for the possible
range of practices that the public domain allows.
243. See NETANEL, supra note 151, at 61-62, 66.
244. FILMMAKERS' STATEMENT, supra note 235, at 6-8.
245. See id. at 6 ("[T]wo goals of the preceding statement are to encourage documentarians to
rely on fair use where it is appropriate and to help persuade the people who insure, distribute,
and program their work to accept and support documentarians in these choices.").
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message or avoid speaking at all, chilled by the threat of possible
costly copyright litigation.2 46
Creators can avoid the limits of expression that the idea/expression
dichotomy and fair use impose, and the indeterminacy and risk of us-
ing copyrighted works, by turning to the public domain. Fair use and
the idea/expression dichotomy certainly provide some breathing space
for free speech, but the public domain provides more. The public do-
main essentially functions to bring recommended practices in line with
actual, uninhibited creative practices. 247 In the public domain, free
creativity allows for free expression-without filtration of content or
message.
The public domain attracts creators because of the advantages it
offers to free expression. 248 Copyright law's limitations may shape
creative decisions, but the absence of limitations allows for a different
level of interaction. The best practices statement reminds filmmakers
that fair use does not have to be boring-perhaps a reaction to the
uneasiness creators may feel when they use copyrighted material.249
The public domain is a resource that allows for unconstrained free
expression, and section 514 disrupts individuals' reliance on the public
domain by placing limitations on their expression after they have en-
gaged public domain works.250 Whether these limits to expression
come in the form of the statutory factors of the fair use analysis, un-
certainty about whether the borrowed material is idea or expression,
or even industry-specific recommended practices, section 514 imposes
limits upon individuals who relied on use that was absolutely uninhib-
ited by copyright. 251 The public domain allows for expression without
guidelines, and restoring copyright for works in the public domain
reinstates these guidelines and limits the speech of those who rely on
the public domain.
246. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 56,
59-60 (2006) (arguing that lawyers and judges are "blind" to the limits of fair use and the ideal
expression dichotomy and in practice fair use really becomes "the right to hire a lawyer").
247. Compare FILMMAKERS' STATEMENT, supra note 235, at 6-8 (guidelines for use of copy-
righted material), with Peter Jaszi,"Yes You Can!"-Where you don't even need 'fair use,' http://
www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/free-use.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (noting, without
need for extensive rules, that public domain works "are free for use").
248. See FISHMAN, supra note 170, at 3.
249. See FILMMAKERS' STATEMENT, supra note 235, at 6.
250. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007).
251. See supra notes 208-213 and accompanying text.
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V. IMPACT
The analysis above focuses on the expressive value of using preex-
isting public domain works and advocates First Amendment review
for a statute that removes works from the public domain. The Golan
decision has greater implications for the application of First Amend-
ment scrutiny to a range of copyright legislation. 252 According to the
Golan court, copyright statutes are suspect if they alter the traditional
contours of copyright. 253 Commentators have questioned whether
this language from Eldred can be used as a coherent test, and they
have also questioned whether the Supreme Court intended to create a
standard to determine when courts should apply First Amendment
scrutiny to copyright statutes. 254
Questions about the applicability of the traditional contours test
raise further questions about the application of First Amendment re-
view of section 514. Do the feasibility problems of the traditional con-
tours test mean that there should be no First Amendment inquiry into
the removal of works from the public domain? The traditional con-
tours inquiry in Golan is a historical and structural analysis of past
treatment of works entering the public domain.25 5 In other words, the
test asks: Is this legislation peculiar to the history or function of copy-
right law? This inquiry just opens the door to the First Amendment
analysis, which then asks: How does this statute affect speech, and do
the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine adequately
address the plaintiff's speech interests?
This Note focuses on the latter question and concludes that the re-
moval of works from the public domain interferes with the free ex-
pression of those who rely on the public domain. While the historical
inquiry into past practices may be informative, the actual analysis of
the First Amendment implications of section 514 should not depend
solely on the traditional contours analysis. Litigants can show an im-
position on free expression that the idea/expression dichotomy and
the fair use doctrine do not alleviate, and the courts can respond by
applying a First Amendment analysis.25 6 In Golan, the Tenth Circuit
correctly recognized that copyright's internal safeguards did not ade-
252. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
253. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1187-88 (reasoning that any act of Congress that alters the traditional
bounds of copyright could be subject to First Amendment scrutiny).
254. See, e.g., Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/
1189051800.shtml (Sept. 6, 2007, 12:10 AM).
255. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1188-89.
256. Recent Case, Tenth Circuit Subjects Copyright Statute to First Amendment Scrutiny: Go-
lan v. Gonzales, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1945, 1951 (2008) (arguing that First Amendment review is
appropriate "whenever new legislation affects speech interests in a manner that copyright's in-
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quately protect against the URAA's threat to the expression of per-
formers, creators, and publishers who could no longer use public
domain works without restrictions. First Amendment scrutiny is es-
sential not just because removing works from the public domain defies
tradition and history, but because the public domain is a valuable, es-
sential zone of free speech that supplements copyright's First Amend-
ment safeguards.
The Tenth Circuit remanded to the district court to determine
whether section 514 violates the First Amendment. 257  The court
noted that because of the strong interest of the United States in ad-
hering to the Berne Convention, the treaty obligations of the United
States may serve as a compelling or significant government interest. 258
Even if the district court finds the treaty interest significant, the court
will still have to decide if there are less restrictive means to carry out
the government's purpose or if the statute is narrowly tailored to that
interest.259 The court noted that other countries have more inclusive
definitions of a reliance party, and that these reliance parties can be
bought out by the owner of the restored copyright.260  Thus, even
though the Berne Convention may provide a compelling reason for
implementing section 514, the district court should inquire why the
United States did not follow the less speech-restrictive course of other
Berne signatories.
The Golan decision is also significant to courts that must analyze
any legislation that removes works from the public domain.261 The
treaty rationale may serve as a compelling interest for restoring for-
eign copyrights, but the rationale does not justify restoring domestic
copyrights. 262 Though the URAA extends only to foreign copyrights,
ternal safeguards cannot cure, even if Congress has not directly altered the idea/expression di-
chotomy or the fair use defense").
257. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196.
258. Id. at 1196 n.5.
259. Id. at 1196.
260. Id. at 1196 n.5. The United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, India, and New Zealand define
a reliance party as any person who "incurs or has incurred any expenditure or liability in connec-
tion with, for the purpose of or with a view to the doing of an act which at the time is not or was
not an act restricted by any copyright in the work." Id. Under the "British, Canadian, Austra-
lian, and Indian systems, 'the reliance party is allowed to continue making those uses of the work
it had made, or incurred commitments to make, before its copyright is restored .... [T]he reli-
ance party must cease exploiting the work if the owner pays compensation, in an amount to be
determined by negotiation or arbitration."' Id.; cf supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text
(providing text of U.S. reliance provision).
261. See David Nimmer on the Potential Invalidation of Portions of the Copyright Act Based on
A Conflict with the First Amendment in Golan v. Gonzales, LExisNExrs EXPERT COMMENTA-
RIEs, Nov. 2007, at 6 [hereinafter NIMMER COMMENTARY].
262. Id.
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copyright scholar David Nimmer warns that "the unsettling prospect
of complete and total resurrection of the dead is now no longer
merely the stuff of copyright science fiction. '263 Copyright owners in
the United States whose works have fallen into the public domain be-
cause of failure to comply with formalities may demand that copyright
be restored for their works, as well. 264 In 1997, Congress extended
restoration to some U.S. works in a technical amendment that effec-
tively restored copyright to works distributed in phonorecords before
1978.265 Therefore, even if section 514 survives First Amendment
scrutiny, the Golan decision provides an important impediment to
comprehensive copyright restoration.266 The decision allows courts to
apply First Amendment scrutiny to other copyright restoration stat-
utes and thus preserves the public domain.
VI. CONCLUSION
We all enjoy the public domain, even if we do not appreciate each
occurrence of our use. We can freely copy from court cases, statutes,
and other government documents. We enjoy countless derivative
works based on works in the public domain in concert halls, in movie
theatres, and on our iPods. We can use the Internet to instantly access
the entire works of Shakespeare or the sheet music for Mozart's piano
sonatas. Beyond these uses, the public domain is an important source
of creative material that encourages free expression. In Golan v.
Gonzales, the Tenth Circuit rightly held that the district court should
apply First Amendment scrutiny to a statute that restored copyright to
public domain works, where the plaintiffs had a vested expressive in-
terest in distributing, performing, and adapting these artistic works.
The public domain encourages truly free speech and allows creators
and others to cast off the considerations that accompany the use of
works under copyright protection. For those who rely on public do-
main works, restoration of copyright to works in the public domain
reinstates the burdens of using copyrighted works. These burdens in
turn limit the free expression of creators, who must then temper their
artistic vision. First Amendment scrutiny is necessary to fully analyze
263. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 9A.01.
264. NIMMER COMMENTARY, supra note 261, at 6.
265. See 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1997); see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 9A.01
(noting that the rationale for the legislation was to give protection in the United States so that
foreign countries would also provide protection to American records released before 1978,
which would provide a financial benefit to American copyright holders).
266. NIMMER COMMENTARY, supra note 261. at 6.
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whether the government's rationale for copyright restoration justifies
burdening the free speech of those who rely on public domain works.
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